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Abstract—A variety of solutions, e.g., Proof-of-Work (PoW),
Proof-of-Stake (PoS), Proof-of-Burn (PoB), and Proof-of-Elapsed-
Time (PoET), have been proposed to make consensus mechanism
used by the blockchain technology more democratic, efficient, and
scalable. However, these solutions have a number of limitations,
e.g., PoW approach requires a huge amount of computational
power, scales poorly, and wastes a lot of electrical energy.
Recently, an ingenious protocol called Algorand has been
proposed to overcome these limitations. Algorand uses an inno-
vative process - called cryptographic sortition - to securely and
unpredictably elect a set of voters from the network periodically.
These voters are responsible for reaching consensus through
a Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocol on one block per time,
guaranteeing an overwhelming probability of linearity of the
blockchain.
In this paper, we present a security analysis of Algorand. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the first security analysis as well as the
first formal study on Algorand. We designed an attack scenario
in which a group of malicious users tries to break the protocol,
or at least limiting it to a reduced partition of network users,
by exploiting a possible security flaw in the messages validation
process of the BA. Since, the source code or an official simulator
for Algorand was not available at the time of our study, we
created a simulator (which is available on request) to implement
the protocol and assess the feasibility of our attack scenario.
Our attack requires the attacker to have a trivial capability of
establishing multiple connections with targeted nodes and costs
practically nothing to the attacker. Our results show that it is
possible to slow down the message validation process on honest
nodes, which eventually forces them to choose default values on
the consensus; leaving the targeted nodes behind in the chain as
compared to the non-attacked nodes. Even though our results
are subject to real-implementation assumption, the core concept
of our attack remains valid.
Index Terms—Altcoin, Bitcoin, Blockchain, Consensus.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the introduction of Bitcoin [1] in 2008, blockchaintechnology has been adopted by almost every scenario
in today’s digital world with an aim to keep temper-proof
records [2]. Originally, the concept of distributed consensus
- upon which the blockchain technology is founded - dates
back to the ’90s [3–6]. But, after the success of Bitcoin, a
multitude of other areas have been transformed by the idea
of a transparent and distributed public ledger, such as elec-
tions, contract management, insurance, charity, and ownership
transfer through inheritance and will [7].
The Bitcoin system combines together different well-known
concepts, such as digital signatures, hashing functions, PoW,
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and Merkle trees. However, with an exponential growth in
the number of users and Bitcoin-miners, the Bitcoin net-
work observed collateral effects of its consensus protocol.
In particular, it suffers from scalability [8], hashing power
centralization, mining strategies exposures [9–11], and energy-
and computational-deficiency [12]. To this end, a variety of so-
lutions have been proposed over time. Some of these solutions
aim to improve the existing version of PoW (e.g., Litecoin1,
Primecoin2 [14]) while other proposals used completely differ-
ent concepts, such as PoS, PoB [15, 16], and PoET [17]. As a
representative example, PoS systems (both stake modification-
based [18–21] and actual balance-based [22, 23]) have serious
concerns from the security point-of-view [24]; such issues
have been partially solved by providing formally-proved se-
curity guarantees [25, 26] or by discouraging users to act
maliciously through punitive procedures [27, 28]. For the
sake of completeness, some other works [29, 30] tried to
achieve better scalability and throughput by implementing a
block graph structure based on Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG),
albeit, these solutions have their own demerits.
On the other side, Algorand [31, 32] - an innovative protocol
for the blockchain technology - aims to solve the “blockchain
trilemma” of decentralization, scalability, and security. It re-
lies on PoS integrated in a BA layout to achieve optimal
resilience against faulty nodes. It guarantees an overwhelming
probability of the blockchain’s linearity and a block rate of
nearly a minute. It is comparable to the approaches presented
in [25, 26] and has the potential to shape the future of the
blockchain technology.
Motivation: Given the promising properties of the Algo-
rand protocol in terms of decentralization and scalability, the
security aspects of this consensus algorithm are crucial. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first analysis of
Algorand’s security. We aim to at least start a discussion about
a possible security flaw on the message validation process,
which could possibly expose honest nodes’ bandwidth and
memory resources to Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks.
Contribution: The major contributions of our work are as
follows:
1) We demonstrate a practically feasible attack on the Al-
gorand protocol. The attack has the potential to target an
arbitrarily sized group of honest users and slow down the
1Litecoin adopted its scrypt PoW function’s design to increase the decen-
tralization of the system and further optimize the mining process [13].
2Primecoin exploits the computational power used for the mining activity
to contribute to mathematical research topics.
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2consensus process; leaving the targeted nodes behind in
the chain as compared to the non-attacked nodes.
2) We implemented the protocol in our simulator created
in Java and evaluated the feasibility of our attack. The
simulator is available on request.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II gives a thorough description of the Algorand
protocol. We elucidate our attack scenario in Section III. Sec-
tion IV presents the implementation details of our simulator,
evaluation settings, and our results. Section V discusses the
feasibility of our attack and the possible countermeasures.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper by listing potential
future works.
II. ALGORAND
Since the main focus of our work is on Algorand, we
first elucidate the Algorand protocol. We introduce the main
limitations of current blockchain technologies in Section II-A.
We present the distinct features of Algorand in Section II-B.
Section II-C discusses the assumptions specified by the Algo-
rand protocol with respect to the adversary model. Section II-D
gives an overview of the network topology, communication
protocol, and the definition of messages. Then, consensus
mechanism of Algorand is described in Section II-E. Finally,
the technical details of “cryptographic sortition” - a critical
component of the consensus process - are discussed in Sec-
tion II-F.
A. The limitations of current Blockchain
The main motivation for the development of Algorand lies
in the underlying assumption and technical problems that are
essentially shared by most of the PoW-based blockchains [31].
Those limitations include:
1) [Assumption] Majority of nodes contributing to the com-
putational power of the network will be honest.
2) [Technical Problem] Wastage of computational power as
well as electrical energy.
3) [Technical Problem] Concentration of power, i.e., the total
computing power for block generation lies within just few
mining pools.
4) [Technical Problem] Ambiguity in the consensus reached
by different network nodes on the confirmed transactions,
which leads to fork of blockchain.
B. Salient features of Algorand
The protocol has distinct and promising features:
1) It is designed to be fully decentralized and democratic.
Moreover, there is no distinction between the role of
different groups of users, e.g., miners vs. “normal” users.
2) Each user runs the same functions with negligible hard-
ware requirements (i.e., with negligible computational
effort) as the concept of miner/mining does not exist in
Algorand.
3) It is scalable with the number of nodes as well as in terms
of confirmed transactions throughput. The authors [32]
have shown that the throughput of Algorand is fifty times
that of Bitcoin.
4) The blockchain does not fork with overwhelming proba-
bility (Pf ork = 10−12).
C. Protocol assumptions
To guarantee security of the blockchain, Algorand relies
on the conventional assumption of PoS systems, i.e., Honest
Majority of Money (HMM). In particular, Algorand assumes
a continuum in the ownership of currency belonging to honest
users, i.e., at any round r at least a fraction h (greater than
two-third) of the money held by honest accounts on round
r − k must still belong to the honest users, for some integers h
and k that are defined by the protocol. Together with HMM,
Algorand requires a partial synchronization assumption on the
honest nodes’ clocks. It states that the honest nodes’ clocks are
not required to be strictly synchronized, but they are assumed
to have the same speed with a bounded tolerance.
Furthermore, Algorand was built to face a very strong
adversary. The adversary is capable to perfectly synchronize
all malicious nodes that he3 controls and can corrupt honest
users indiscriminately and instantly. However, the attacker’s
capabilities are bounded by the following three main facts:
(1) he can corrupt honest users until the HMM property is
maintained; (2) he cannot forge secret keys of the honest
users that he have not corrupted; and (3) he cannot prevent
the honest recipient to receive messages.
D. Network communication
The Algorand network is a Bitcoin-like peer-to-peer net-
work. Each user is identified by a public/private key pair,
and each key pair corresponds to a node in the topology.
For simplicity, we will use the terms “user” and “node”
interchangeably. Each node establishes and maintains a dif-
ferent TCP connection with each of his peers. The current
specifications of Algorand do not specify if a node has to
choose his peers based on their stake, which indeed exposes
the network to a Sybil attack4.
Nodes broadcast messages through the network using a
standard gossip protocol - each node gossips his message to
his peers, who in turn relays it to their neighbors. A message
has to be validated before it can be relayed, and it is never
sent twice to the same user. The protocol defines four types
of messages: (1) transactions; (2) voting messages; (3) block
proposals; and (4) credential messages. A transaction (t) from
user i to user j is defined as:
t = sigi(pki, pk j, a, I,H(SI)), (1)
where pku is the public key of the user u, a stands for the
amount of Algorand units to transfer from pki to pk j , I is
an optional string to describe the transfer, H(SI) is a 256-bit
hash produced by hashing a secret string SI (not specified in
3In this paper, we have mentioned different entities as a masculine entity
without any gender-bias.
4In a sybil attack, the attacker creates a large number of nodes at zero cost
(i.e., with no stake) to increase the probability of connecting with his targets.
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the body of the message), and sigu(x) denotes digitally signed
data x using the private key of user u.
A voting message (vm) from a user i in round r and step s
is defined as:
vmr,si = (sig(vr,si ), σr,si ), (2)
where σr,si represents the sortition proof of the user i in
sth step of r th round (further details in Section II-F), vr,si
defines the vote of user i in round r and step s.
A block proposal (bp) for round r from user i is defined as:
bpri = (Bri , sigi(H(Bri )), σr,1i ), (3)
where Bri is defined as
Bri =
{
(r, PAY r, sigi(Qr−1),H(Br−1)), if Bri , Er ;
(r,Qr−1,H(Br−1)), otherwise; (4)
where PAY r is the set of transactions t, while Qr is called
seed and defined as
Qr =
{
H(siglr (Qr−1, r)), if Br , Er ;
H(Qr−1, r), otherwise; (5)
where lr is the user who created the consensus block Br for
round r . The seed is a parameter needed in the sortition process
(more details in Section II-F). Er is the default block for round
r , and it is defined as
Er = (r,Qr−1,H(Br−1)). (6)
Finally, the credential message (cm) from a user i for a
round r is defined as:
cmri = (σr,1i ). (7)
It consists of the sortition proof of the block proposer (in this
case, user i). Each sortition proof is associated with a priority
value in a deterministic way (further details in Section II-F).
Credential messages are far smaller in size than the block
proposals. Thus, they propagate faster through the network.
Credential messages are gossiped by the block proposers at
the beginning of a round along with their block proposals.
Since the block proposals and the credential messages from
the same block proposer contain the same sortition proof, the
peer nodes can leverage the priority values from the credential
messages to not relay block proposals with low priorities -
which helps in preventing congestion in the network.
E. Consensus algorithm
Algorand’s consensus algorithm consists of a synchronous
protocol that combines the concepts of PoS systems with a
Byzantine fault tolerance agreement. The protocol virtually
schedules the time into rounds. At each round, all the network
nodes attempt to reach consensus on a new block of transac-
tions. Each round is composed of the following actions:
• Each node in the network must first check its role to
determine whether he has to propose a block for a given
round. To do so, the nodes use cryptographic sortition,
which requires them to run a trivial (a single hash)
computation challenge. In case a node has to propose
a block, he collects all the pending transactions inside a
block proposal and gossips it together with the sortition
proof. The block’s size is limited by a fixed protocol
parameter.
• Each node waits for incoming block proposals from the
previous step for a predefined duration of time. Among
all the valid blocks he receives, he selects the one with
the highest priority sortition proof. Then, he computes an
hash using this block, sets this hash as the input for the
BA of the next steps.
• All nodes in the network try to reach consensus on one
block through a BA protocol. The BA has two key phases.
Both the phases are composed by subsequent steps. At
each step, a distinct group of users (called committee
members) is elected in an unpredictable way through
cryptographic sortition. These committee members spread
their voting messages based on votes received from the
previous step. The committee members attach a sortition
proof that proves their legitimacy while spreading their
voting messages. The two phases of BA are as follows:
1) The first phase is called the reduction phase that
comprises two steps. In the first step, each committee
member votes for the hash of the blocks proposed for
consideration. In the second step, committee members
vote for the hash that received votes over a certain
threshold (defined by protocol). In case none of the
hash/block receives enough votes, committee members
vote for the hash of the default empty block.
2) The next phase consists of another binary BA to ensure
that each node agrees on the same consensus; the
consensus can conclude on the output of the previous
phase or on the default value in the absence of a
majority.
F. Cryptographic sortition
Cryptographic sortition is used by each network node at the
beginning of every step of each phase to determine whether he
has a role in that particular step. It is a simple and lightweight
process that involves computing a single hash and a digital
signature. The sortition algorithm is implemented using a
Verifiable Random Function (VRF5) [33]. In particular, the
hash for a certain step s and round r is computed by the
user i as
y = H(sigi(r, s,Qr−1)), (8)
where H is a hashing function, y a 256-bit long hash, and Qr−1
is the seed quantity defined by Eq. 5. sigi(r, s,Qr−1) is called
the sortition proof and is attached to voting messages or block
proposals to prove the legitimacy of the corresponding voters
or block proposers. The hash is used by the nodes to verify a
certain sortition condition. The possibility that the condition
is verified is directly proportional to the stake of the node and
depends on a constant parameter pirole fixed in the protocol,
5VRF functions allow users to produce verifiable computations. The users
produce a proof using their private keys, which can be verified by other users
via the producer’s public key.
4which guarantees that on average a fixed number of nodes
are elected at each step for a certain role. For this reason, the
protocol allows users to be elected more than once in the same
step. A user i can possibly be elected at each step wi times,
where wi is the number of user’s units of currency. Formally,
the interval [0, 1) is partitioned into wi intervals I, where the
j-th interval Ij is defined as:
Ij =
[ j∑
x=0
B(x;wi; p),
j+1∑
x=0
B(x;wi; p)
)
, j ∈ (0, 1, ...wi) (9)
where B(x;wi; p) is the binomial probability that user i is
elected exactly x times on wi chances, each with probability
p = pirole/W . Here, pirole estimates the expected number of
sorted users for that role and W is the total amount of currency
in the network. The number of votes are found by applying
the binary point operator to the hash (i.e., y/2y.length) and
searching the interval Ij with which the value is associated. If
the value lies on the j-th interval, then i can vote j times. There
are at least three interesting observations about this procedure:
1) Since on average a fixed number of nodes are elected at
each step, the traffic of voting messages in the network
does not increase with the number of participants.
2) The procedure to decide whether a user i is sorted for a
certain step in a round can be executed only by the user i
as it involves a signature process.
3) Since Qr−1 can be computed by a node only when that
node reaches consensus on round r − 1, the result of
the sortition of user i in a certain step of round r is
unpredictable and unknown even to the user i. This avoids
the possibility of collusion between voters of one or more
steps to manipulate the consensus process on a certain
round.
III. OUR ATTACK
We explain our attack in this section, starting from attack
preliminaries in Section III-A followed by a brief introduction
to flooding attacks in Section III-B, and the description of our
attack in Section III-C.
A. Attack preliminaries
In our adversary model, we assume that all the malicious
nodes are coordinated by a single/unique entity. This translates
into the following two properties of the malicious nodes:
1) Each malicious node can sign messages using any other
malicious node’s private key.
2) The malicious nodes participate in the protocol either
passively or actively. These malicious nodes coordinate
and use the messages they receive from their honest peers
to be aware of the protocol’s execution status.
We assume that all the malicious nodes and their public/private
key pairs were created by the adversary sufficiently in advance,
i.e., before the attack takes place. This enables all of them to
become the voters or block proposers in the protocol6. As
6This assumption is necessary because Algorand increases the unpre-
dictability of the outcome of sortition process by limiting the set of keys
that can participate in the process. The eligible keys must be created at least
k rounds before.
mentioned in Section II-D, we can also safely assume that the
network is vulnerable to the Sybil attack, meaning that the
honest nodes choose their peers randomly without relying on
their stake. In this way, the malicious nodes have the same
probability as of the other nodes to connect to honest peers.
On the other side, honest peers can control/limit the number
of incoming connections, denoted by max-connections.
B. A typical flooding attack
In a typical network scenario, a flooding attack targets
honest nodes’ bandwidth and memory resources by sending
a huge number of message to him. Typically, the attack is
performed at the application layer and messages are sent
over previously established connections. Generally, a flooding
attack sends a huge number of fake or invalid messages
towards the target nodes to slow down their message reception
and message processing. Crafting such attacks from a single
nodes is not very effective because nodes in Bitcoin-like
decentralized networks - where no level of trust is assumed
between participants - often rely on “misbehaviour” scores
to label and identify possible malicious users. As soon as an
honest node decides that one of his peers is malicious, he can
stop processing messages from that peer, drop the connection,
and blacklist him to prevent future connection requests from
that peer for a certain time. Hence, the attacker needs a large
number of malicious nodes connected to the target. So he can
send some messages from each connection in a coordinated
manner and create the same impact without being detected (or
at least fully detected).
C. Magnifying attack’s impact using undecidable messages
Our attack aims to increase the impact of the flooding
attacks by exploiting the message validation process of Al-
gorand. Due its design, our attack also enables an adversary
to have a longer connection time before getting blacklisted by
the target node. In Algorand, each message that is a part of the
consensus algorithm (i.e., voting messages (Eq. 2) and block
proposals (Eq. 3)) is subject to two distinct checks during the
validation process:
1) Stateless checks: A set of checks on a message/packet that
a validator node can perform to know its current status
(e.g., packet’s structure, packet’s authentication, check for
duplicated messages).
2) Sortition proof check: The sortition proof must be
checked to verify that the sender/author of the message
had the right to gossip it.
As described Section II-F, the sortition proof is a byte-
string that represents the signature of a user i in the form
sigi(r, s,Qr−1), the validator node should hash this string to
verify whether the given output satisfies the sortition property.
However, before blindly hashing the signature, the protocol
requires him to verify it first. Thus, he needs all the parameters
- that were originally used to create it - including the seed
quantity Qr−1. This is a stateful check because the validator
should have already reached consensus on the round r − 1 to
independently compute Qr−1. If that is not the case, then the
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message cannot be fully validated at the current status of the
validator node. In such a situation, the only option that the
validator node has is to store the message and wait until it
can be fully validated because messages that are not yet fully
validated, cannot be discarded. We refer to these messages as
undecidable messages.
At this point, the aim of the attacker is to flood honest
targets with as many undecidable messages as possible to
saturate their bandwidth and possibly their memory. These
two objectives decide the type and number of messages used
to construct our attack vector. With respect to the type,
we chose the largest possible message, i.e., block proposals
containing max-sized blocks. Since messages need to pass the
stateless checks, each public key can gossip only a single block
proposal per round. However, keys are created at zero cost
and each malicious node can sign messages with any of the
adversary keys. Moreover, each node can include an arbitrary
number of block proposals in his payload - one for each key7.
Now, we describe the attack’s execution in practice. The
attacker connects to his target as one of his peers. Since
the target node is assumed to honestly execute the Algorand
protocol, as soon as he receives and validates a message
for a certain round r , he has to relay it to all of his peers
including the malicious node. Hence, the attacker just needs
to (1) prepare its payload in advance8 for the attack in
round r; (2) wait to receive a block proposal or a credential
message (Eq. 7) from his target9 in round r to be aware of
the fact that the target has started the execution of round r;
and (3) send the payload to the target from each connected
malicious node.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we present the evaluation of our proposed
attack. Section IV-A provides the technical details of our
simulator while the evaluation settings and the results are
presented in Section IV-B and Section IV-C, respectively.
A. Simulator
Since, the source code or an official simulator for Algorand
was not available at the time of our experiments, we built
our own simulator that is completely written in Java. Both
7As long as the messages are authenticated and sent only once, a single
public key is able to create a different undecidable message for every step in
each round. It means that it can create a block proposal on the first step and a
voting message for every step of BA (until the maximum m-th step allowed
by the protocol). However, sending one message for every step implies that
the given public key is sorted at every step of that round, which is very
unlikely. A similar argument can be used by the target node to statistically
label malicious users without waiting for their messages to be fully verifiable.
Moreover, given a reasonable max-block size (order of MB) and m set to 150
steps [32], a single block proposal containing a max-size block would make
up the large majority of the total payload weight. Hence, choosing a single
block proposal for each key would imply that each user is elected only once
in a given round, and cheaters are more difficult to identify a-priori.
8The attacker does not need any information to pre-compute a payload for a
certain round r . He just needs to sign some random messages declaring them
as if they belong to round r + 1. All additional information will be checked
only once the message becomes fully verifiable in round r + 1, by that time
the attacker would have already achieved his goal.
9Block proposals together with the credential messages are gossiped first
through the network at each round.
the works [31, 32] on Algorand propose slightly different, but
overlapping versions of the protocol. The differences are in the
terminating conditions to reach the final majority consensus
within BA. However, our threat model is independent of
the particulars of the chosen version of BA. We referred to
the protocol described in the technical paper [32] for the
implementation in our simulator.
We model an honest node as an entity composed of three
main components: (1) a network interface to send/receive
messages from peers; (2) a validator process to verify the
received messages; and (3) the process that runs the protocol.
Since our attack focuses on flooding block proposals or voting
messages, transactions are never sent/received directly in our
simulation. Instead, the throughput (transactions confirmed per
second) is simulated by creating block proposals containing a
fixed number of arbitrary transactions10.
To reduce the impact of simultaneous/parallel signature
verification during simulation, we simulate block validation
by using a sleep procedure. Furthermore, nodes are provided
with a cache memory not to verify the same transaction
twice11. While block signatures are simulated other checks,
e.g., packet authentication and sortition proof validation, are
actually computed legitimately. We do not assume any latency
in the network communication for the sake of presenting the
minimum impact of our proposed attack, which would further
enhance in the presence of latency.
B. Evaluation settings
All simulations were done on a virtual machine on Open-
Stack [34] running Ubuntu 16.04 with 16 Intel Core Processors
(Hashwell, no TSX, IBRS) and 64 GB of RAM. In our
experiments, we simulated a network of 500 nodes, where
each node had a 30 Mbps upload and 30 Mbps download
bandwidth. The target nodes were connected to all the ma-
licious nodes involved in the attack. However, the number
of malicious nodes does not represent the max-connections
parameter controlled by the honest nodes as honest nodes
were connected to malicious as well as other honest peers. For
the sake of simplicity, we assumed that once an undecidable
message fails in the verification process, then all messages
from the sender of that message are discarded without being
processed. Each simulation was run for ∼45 minutes, and the
attack payload was prepared using different blocks sizes during
different experiments.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack, we primarily
focus on the number of “legitimate” messages received and
validated in due time by the honest nodes as well as on the
average time taken to complete a round. The two evaluation
metrics are correlated in a way that if too many messages
are not received or processed in due time for a given step,
the execution time of the corresponding step increases until
a timeout is reached. We thoroughly evaluated our attack
scenario by varying the number of malicious nodes involved
10We assume that in a real implementation of the protocol, messages and
transactions are processed by independent processes.
11Without a dedicated cache, transactions are validated at least twice. The
time when the transaction is gossiped by its original creator and the time
when it is received in a block.
6in the attack as well as the number of block proposals sent
from each malicious node. In particular, the maximum number
of tested block proposals (sent from one malicious node at
the time of attack) was 70, following the analysis of the
cryptographic sortition for block proposers by the authors of
the protocol [32]. We set the block proposal receiving time
and the step timeout (explained in the next section) to 150
and 60 seconds, respectively. Finally, we also evaluated the
impact of our attack by varying the size of the attack payload.
C. Results
The execution time for a round consists of two parts: block
proposal receiving time and step timeout. The block proposal
receiving time is constant and is defined as the maximum
window of time for the nodes to receive the block proposals
for a given round. The step timeout is the maximum amount
of time by which each step must complete. Here, each step
finishes as soon as enough voting messages are processed
or the step timeout occurs. In “no attack” scenario, the
largest contribution to round time should come from the block
proposal receiving time and the steps should execute before
the step timeout occurs. The same is reflected in our results
shown in Fig. 1. Here, in the absence of malicious nodes,
nearly 83% of the round time was taken by the fixed block
proposal receiving window. On the other side, the round time
remains nearly the same as “no attack” scenario with a lower
number of malicious nodes/keys per malicious node. However,
the protocol’s performance starts to deteriorate with increasing
number of malicious nodes/keys per malicious node, starting
from the attack payload size of just 500 blocks (10 malicious
nodes with 50 malicious keys). In facts, the average round time
with all the remaining higher attack configurations was over
390 seconds; which means that these configurations caused
at least four step timeouts in addition to the block proposal
receiving time. As mentioned earlier, our proposed attack does
not prevent nodes from reaching consensus. Instead, it aims to
significantly increase the execution time of each round, which
eventually leads the attacked nodes to reach their consensus
on the default value, leaving the targeted nodes behind the
non-attacked nodes in the chain.
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The next important criteria to evaluate the impact of an
attack on Algorand is the percentage of “legitimate” messages
received and “legitimate” messages validated in due time.
Fig. 2 shows the effect of our attack upon “legitimate”
messages received and validated with respect to the number
of malicious nodes and keys per malicious nodes. Also here,
with an attack payload of just 500 blocks (10 malicious
nodes with 50 malicious keys), the percentage of “legitimate”
messages received/validated starts to degrade considerably,
which eventually lead to step failures.
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It is important to mention that an adversary can tune our
attack on the number of malicious nodes/keys to prevent
the detection while still creating significant disturbance in
the network. Moreover, the size of the blocks is another
important parameter to tune the attack. The results presented
in the Figures 1 and 2 were obtained using 1 MB of attack
payload. Tables I and II show the impact of attack payload’s
size upon the average round time and the percentage of
“legitimate” messages received as well as validated in due
time, respectively. Our results show that the size of the block
does not significantly affect the performance of honest nodes
in the absence of the attack. However, increasing size of
the attack payload severely affect the performance of honest
nodes in term of both the average round time and messages
processed. It happens because the block’s size directly affects
the download time of a block, which is further worsened by
the number of malicious nodes and the keys per malicious
nodes involved in the attack.
TABLE I
EFFECT OF THE ATTACK PAYLOAD’S SIZE UPON AVERAGE ROUND TIME
Block size
(in MB)
Keys/malicious
node
5 malicious
nodes
10 malicious
nodes
15 malicious
nodes
No
attack
0.5
25 178.65 180.55 182.36
181.4250 180.73 181.36 181.72
70 178.98 180.45 237.27
1.0
25 182.21 182.87 183.24
181.1650 182.49 232.15 391.16
70 181.69 391.12 391.45
1.5
25 180.16 180.97 241.52
181.5450 181.22 391.58 391.66
70 235.76 391.28 391.54
2.0
25 178.97 226.63 391.31
182.3150 226.59 390.88 391.57
70 391.39 391.83 391.93
Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Time (s)
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TABLE II
EFFECT OF THE ATTACK PAYLOAD’S SIZE UPON THE PERCENTAGE OF “LEGITIMATE” MESSAGES RECEIVED AND VALIDATED
Block size (in MB) Keys/malicious node 5 malicious nodes 10 malicious nodes 15 malicious nodes No attack
0.5
25 96.98 91.61 97.26 92.49 97.08 90.16
97.51 90.5350 97.37 92.87 96.07 90.90 94.96 90.43
70 97.85 91.25 96.04 90.21 75.03 64.99
1.0
25 97.70 91.02 97.98 92.41 92.46 87.77
96.32 89.750 96.81 89.75 80.52 72.72 45.47 44.06
70 94.24 88.41 42.31 41.46 10.66 10.55
1.5
25 99.32 94.85 93.62 89.97 65.62 63.32
97.43 90.7750 93.25 86.65 44.63 43.10 8.75 8.02
70 73.57 67.28 25.93 24.32 6.79 5.82
2.0
25 97.83 92.01 80.03 73.21 42.96 41.59
96.80 90.0950 79.99 75.12 26.66 25.21 1.05 1.00
70 55.37 49.71 4.96 4.83 0.95 0.91
Messages
received (%)
Messages
validated (%)
Messages
received (%)
Messages
validated (%)
Messages
received (%)
Messages
validated (%)
Messages
received (%)
Messages
validated (%)
V. FEASIBILITY OF THE ATTACK
The attack costs practically nothing to an adversary. How-
ever, the adversary has to overcome one minor challenge,
i.e., to connect at least one malicious node with the honest
target. This malicious node can then flood the target with
an arbitrarily large number of block proposals - one for each
public key controlled by the adversary. However, the recipient
can monitor and label connections from which he receives a
suspiciously large number of messages for a round. Then, it
is likely that the honest nodes would simply drop (or, at least
temporarily stop listening) from such a connection. Hence,
the success of our attack depends on how many malicious
connections an attacker is able to establish with the target
node.
The other important aspects of our attack are: (1) since TCP
connections are required to be established, IP spoofing is not
an option12 and real addresses should be used; (2) the target’s
max-connections parameter defines the maximum number of
connections allowed towards it. We believe that the former
issue can be solved by using botnet or relying on hidden
services, such as Tor, to protect the address identity inside
the network. However, the max-connections parameter is out
of the adversary’s control. Hence, it is considered as an attack
variable in our attack scenario. Consequently, establishing and
maintaining a high number of connections with the target
nodes is somehow a bit more challenging. But, the goal is
achievable due to the current design of the protocol, where
peers are not weighted on their stake.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The Algorand protocol was proposed to overcome the limi-
tations of conventional blockchain technologies. The protocol
has great potential and is in under active development. In
this paper, we present a particular security flaw of Algorand
protocol that exploits its process of validating messages. In
particular, we evaluated a possible DDoS-like flooding sce-
nario under practical assumptions, where honest nodes suffer
12Establishing TCP connections via IP spoofing is problematic as one can-
not complete the TCP three-way handshake protocol; because the responses
(i.e., the SYN-ACK packets) from the target nodes are not addressed to the real
location of a malicious node. If we assume such possibility, then the adversary
has control over at least one router on the path between the fake address and
the target, or the target node’s network has allowed source-routing [35] of the
messages, or the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in the handshake protocol is
vulnerable to the prediction attack. All of these assumptions are quite strong
hypothesis.
significant delays in the execution of protocol. Furthermore,
we also discuss the major factors that make this attack scenario
more challenging for the honest nodes. Finally, we also present
possible solutions to prevent such an attack. The rigorous
formalization of these countermeasures is kept as the future
work.
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